Tap, send, sold? The High Court considers WhatsApp communications, signatures and the disposition of property

The High Court’s recent decision in Reid-Roberts v Mei-Lin [2026] EWHC 49 (Ch) regarding WhatsApp communications may cause you to reconsider whether to add a moniker to your messages. While this decision related to s53 of the Law of Property Act 1925 (“LPA”) the principles set out in the judgment have wider-ranging significance, as they apply to any requirement for a document to be signed.

Background

During their divorce proceedings, Audun Mar Gudmundsson and Hsiao Mei-Lin sent a series of WhatsApp messages, followed by emails, regarding their family home. During these exchanges they appeared to come to an agreement that Ms Mei-Lin would have the home, but matters instead ended in uncertainty.

While Mr Gudmundsson and Ms Mei-Lin’s financial remedy proceedings were being determined, a Bankruptcy Order was made against Mr Gudmundsson, such that his 50% interest in the family home transferred to bankruptcy trustees. Ms Mei-Lin applied to have the Bankruptcy Order annulled, on the basis that Mr Gudmundsson had transferred his beneficial interest in the family home to her via the WhatsApp messages (in advance of the Bankruptcy Order). The Court did not agree with this interpretation and held that no beneficial interest had been transferred. This decision was then appealed to the High Court. 

High Court decision

Approving the decision of the Deputy Judge at first instance, the High Court held that Mr Gudmundsson had not agreed to dispose of the property, nor had he evinced an intention to unequivocally divest himself immediately of his beneficial interest in it. Although not strictly necessary given the conclusion it had already reached, the High Court then assessed whether the WhatsApp exchanges between Mr Gudmundsson and Ms Mei-Lin were sufficient to satisfy s53 of the relevant legislation, LPA (such that the beneficial interest was transferred).

The Court highlighted that for property to be disposed of under s53, it must be in writing and be signed. The High Court therefore considered whether a sender’s name appearing at the top of a WhatsApp conversation was sufficient to satisfy the LPA’s “signature” requirement. Ms Mei-Lin had argued in this context that the standard for determining what is a signature is an “intention to authenticate the document” and that it was irrelevant whether Mr Gudmundsson had entered his name into the sender information himself, “so long as the intention behind the same was to authenticate the fact that the relevant WhatsApp’s came from him.” 

The High Court reviewed a number of authorities relating to signatures and authenticating intention, particularly relating to email signoffs, ultimately holding that the necessary authenticating intent was not present in the WhatsApp messages. This was on the basis that the sender information in the header of the conversation was “incidental to the messages rather than being an integral part thereof” such that s53 was not satisfied.

Comment

The decision in Reid-Roberts comes relatively hot on the heels of the Court of Appeal’s decision in DAZN Limited v Coupang Corp. [2025] EWCA Civ 1083, where WhatsApp messages were deemed to be sufficient to conclude contractual arrangements, despite the “informality” of the medium. This is an important further reminder that exchanges by WhatsApp can be considered contractually binding in some circumstances.

This latest decision in Reid-Roberts is particularly significant in relation to questions of when documents can be considered ‘signed’ over WhatsApp, in situations (as in this case) where signing is critical. In the property context it is clearly a practical outcome, preventing property being able to be disposed of casually and without the necessary intention via messaging service. 

Most WhatsApp users are unlikely to sign their name at the end of each message. As their sender information is often saved onto the receiver’s device, self-identifying is not needed within the message itself. The Reid-Roberts judgment rightly recognises that for a signature to have been applied via WhatsApp there is a need for something to be added to the message concerned to make it clear that there was an objective authorising intent. Given the ongoing popularity of WhatsApp it is likely that this issue of what exactly will be sufficient for a particular WhatsApp message to be ‘signed’ will continue to arise in future litigation. In the meantime, the recent cases have made it clear that a sender adding a name to a WhatsApp message may in some circumstances be considered to have ‘signed’ and contracting parties will need to be mindful of this.