Online platforms and the Brussel I bis Regulation: the Judgment of the European Court of Justice in the Dutch Apple App Store Case (Case C‑34/24)

1. Introduction

On 2 December 2025, the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) ruled that Dutch courts have jurisdiction to hear a representative action against Apple seeking compensation for the damage caused by anticompetitive conduct in respect of its App Store in the Netherlands. The proceedings are brought against Apple Inc. and Apple Distribution International Ltd (Apple) by two collective action foundations, Stichting App Stores Claims (ASC)[1] and Stichting Right to Consumer Justice (RCJ)[2], under the Dutch collective action regime (WAMCA). The foundations ASC and RCJ allege that Apple has committed anticompetitive conduct in relation to its Dutch App Store. In 2023 the proceedings led the Amsterdam District Court to request a preliminary ruling from the CJEU on the question of jurisdiction.

The upshot of the CJEU’s judgment is that, for the purpose of determining the place where the damage occurred under Article 7 (2) Brussel I bis, the virtual space constituted by the App Store NL corresponds to the entire territory of the state. The damage can therefore be deemed to occur across the entire territory of the Netherlands, without the need to pinpoint where the users were located when the relevant purchases were made or where they are domiciled.

This article will provide a brief overview of the Dutch WAMCA regime, discuss the referral judgment of the Amsterdam District Court, and consider the CJEU judgment and its implications.

2. Background proceedings 

2.1  The Dutch WAMCA regime

The proceedings against Apple are brought under the Dutch collective action regime Wet Afwikkeling Massaschade in Collectieve Actie (WAMCA) (literally translated: The Act on the Resolution of Mass Damages in Collective Action).[3] The WAMCA entered into effect in January 2020 and was later amended in accordance with the Representative Actions Directive. The act allows Dutch foundations to claim damages in collective actions.[4]

WAMCA-proceedings consist of specific stages and requirements. When bringing proceedings under the WAMCA, the representative entity, usually  a foundation, needs to meet several admissibility criteria. These criteria relate to, among other things, representativeness, governance and the extent to which the interests of the represented victims are sufficiently similar.[5] The court will have to decide if the foundation qualifies to become the so-called Exclusive Representative for all the victims. This is especially relevant in cases where claims are brought by multiple, competing, foundations. The Exclusive Representative will represent a ‘strictly defined group’. The persons in this strictly defined group are automatically bound by the outcome of the proceedings, unless they express their desire to ‘opt out’ of the proceedings during the opt-out phase. A WAMCA foundation is thus an independent representative of the persons affected by the harm. It conducts the proceedings in its own name and does not act on power of attorney or as an assignee of the individual victims’ claims. Given the opt-out nature of the proceedings, a foundation usually does not know the names of all the persons that it represents at the outset of the proceedings.[6]

WAMCA proceedings can be brought before any District Court in the Netherlands that can assume jurisdiction. The Dutch legislator deliberately refrained from designating a single court to hear all WAMCA cases.[7]

2.2  Main proceedings

In the WAMCA proceedings, ASC and RCJ allege that Apple has abused its dominant position within the meaning of Article 102 TFEU on, inter alia, the market for the distribution of iOS-apps.

Apple designed the iOS-system in such a manner that apps can only be downloaded through the Apple App Store. Developers wishing to make their app available on iOS devices have no choice but to distribute via the App Store, and iOS users have, in turn, no choice but to obtain their desired apps via the App Store.[8] When users download a paid app or purchase an in-app product, Apple withholds from the developer 30% of the price as a commission.[9]

The foundations claim that the commission is excessive and that Apple has engaged in exclusionary practices.[10] They accordingly allege that Apple violates article 102 TFEU (which prohibits the abuse of a dominant position). In addition, RCJ claims that Apple’s behaviour constitutes price fixing, as prohibited by article 101 TFEU.[11]

Apple App Stores have so-called country-specific ‘storefronts’. When a user with a Dutch Apple ID opens the App Store, they will automatically be directed to the Dutch storefront App Store (the App Store NL).^[12] Accordingly, the foundations represent the interests of all (consumer and business) users of Apple products and services, that were offered or bought products in the ‘App Store with a Dutch storefront’; the Apple App Store for the Dutch market. 

3. Legal framework and the District Court’s assessment of its jurisdiction

3.1  Jurisdiction

As Apple Distribution International Ltd (Apple Ireland) is domiciled in an EU member state, the jurisdiction of the Amsterdam District Court is determined on the basis of the relevant provisions of the Brussel I bis regulation.[13]

Pursuant to Article 4 (1) Brussel I bis, “persons domiciled in a Member State shall, whatever their nationality, be sued in the courts of that Member State.” Following the main provision of Brussel I bis, Apple Ireland should therefore be sued in Ireland. However, Brussel I bis allows for alternative (or special) grounds of jurisdiction.

By way of derogation from Article 4 (1), Article 7 (2) Brussel I bis provides that in case of tort, the courts of the place where the harmful event occurred or may occur are allowed to hear claims against defendants that are domiciled in another Member State. Since the provision concerns the ‘place’ where the damage occurred, Article 7 (2) directly confers both international and territorial jurisdiction on the courts of the place where the damage occurred.[14]

Therefore, if the harmful event occurred in Amsterdam, the courts of the Netherlands have international jurisdiction and the courts of Amsterdam have territorial jurisdiction. In those circumstances, a claim should be brought at the District Court of Amsterdam. The special ground of jurisdiction is based on a particularly close connecting factor between the dispute and the courts of the place where the harmful event occurred. In the words of the CJEU, the connecting factor “justifies the attribution of jurisdiction to those courts for reasons relating to the sound administration of justice and the efficacious conduct of proceedings.”[15]

It follows from established case law that the ‘place where the harmful event occurred’ relates to both the place where the event that has caused the damage occurred and to the place where the damage is suffered. The former is known as the Handlungsort (the place where the act, handlung in German, took place). The latter is referred to as the Erfolgsort (the place of the erfolg, the result). Defendants may thus be sued, at the option of the claimant, in either of those places.[16]

In flyLAL-Lithuanian Airlines the CJEU held that, in abuse of dominance cases contrary to Article 102 TFEU, the Handlungsort is based on the implementation of that abuse (i.e. the acts performed by the dominant undertaking to put the abuse into practice). It should be noted that the abuse concerned the offering and applying of predatory pricing in the market. [17]

With regard to the Erfolgsort, the CJEU has held that where the market affected by the anticompetitive conduct is in the Member State on whose territory the alleged damage is purported to have occurred, that Member State must be regarded as the place where the damage occurred.[18] In Verein für Konsumenteninformation, the CJEU ruled that, in a case where infringing behaviour caused products to be defective and of lower value, the courts of the place where the goods were purchased have jurisdiction over an action for compensation.[19] Lastly, it follows from Volvo e.a. that the Erfolgsort should be understood as either the place where the undertaking claiming to be harmed purchased the goods affected by the anticompetitive arrangements or, in case of purchases made in several places, the place where the claimant undertaking’s registered office is situated.[20]

3.2  Referral judgment

Arguments of the parties concerned

ASC and RCJ asserted that both the Handlungsort and the Erfolgsort are located in the Netherlands. The foundations argued that the abuse was implemented in the Netherlands by, among other things, charging an excessive commission on the App Store NL. The harmful event accordingly took place in the Netherlands. Since the Dutch market was clearly affected by the abuse, the foundations argued that the damage was suffered in the Netherlands as well. With regard to the territorial jurisdiction of the Amsterdam District Court, the foundations asserted that a substantial amount of their supporters reside in the Amsterdam Court district and therefore suffered damages there. The foundations submitted that EU law does not prevent courts from accepting jurisdiction for the entire group of victims, including those who reside elsewhere in the Member State. Any other interpretation would be contrary to the objective of class actions and undermine its effectiveness.[21]

Apple contested the international jurisdiction of the courts of the Netherlands and the territorial jurisdiction of the Amsterdam District Court. It argued that the Handlungsort cannot be located in the Netherlands or in Amsterdam, since no specific events took place there. Apple furthermore argued that the place where the damage is suffered can only be determined on an individual basis, such that the Erfolgsort is not a suitable criterion in collective proceedings. As a subsidiary argument, it asserted that the Amsterdam District Court is only allowed to accept jurisdiction for the persons that reside in the Amsterdam Court district.[22]

The Amsterdam District Court

The District Court ruled that courts of the Netherlands have international jurisdiction with regard to the claim under Article 102 TFEU. The court found as relevant facts that (i) the App Store NL specifically targets the Dutch market; (ii) through the App Store, Apple maintains an online sales platform where users can purchase apps and in-app products; (iii) Apple Ireland acts as the exclusive distributor and commission agent[23] of apps that are developed by third parties; and (iv) Apple decides which apps can be distributed through the App Store NL. [24]

With reference to the above-mentioned flyLAL-Lithuanian Airlines case, the District Court reached the conclusion that the abuse has been carried out in the Netherlands, such that the Handlungsort is located in the Netherlands.[25] However, in respect of RCJ’s separate claim regarding Article 101 TFEU, the Court did not see sufficient ground to find jurisdiction on the basis of the Handlungsort. The Court held that there were no sufficient facts to determine a specific event concerning the alleged violation of Article 101 TFEU.[26]

With regard to the Erfolgsort, the District Court rejected Apple’s argument that the place where the damage is suffered is not a suitable criterion in collective actions. After reviewing relevant CJEU case law, the court held that, since the Dutch market is specifically affected by the alleged anticompetitive conduct and most of the users who made purchases through the App Store NL are located in the Netherlands, the users’ damage is suffered in the Netherlands as well.[27]

Having accepted international jurisdiction, the District Court stated that the assessment of the territorial jurisdiction (i.e. the question of which specific court in the Netherlands has jurisdiction) is more complicated. The court held that apps and in-app products can be purchased anywhere in the Netherlands via the App Store NL. The place of purchase is therefore difficult to determine and is not a useful consideration. The District Court considered adopting the place of residence/domicile of the purchaser as the relevant test, but held that – if the place of residence is decisive – eleven district courts could have jurisdiction. The court clarified that it has, at the very least, jurisdiction in so far as the claim concerns users in the Amsterdam Court district. According to the District Court there was however reasonable doubt as to whether this applies for users that reside elsewhere in the Netherlands as well.[28]

The District Court accordingly decided to refer the matter to the CJEU. In essence, it asked to CJEU to answer what should be considered to be the place where the harmful act occurred (question 1 (a)) and the place where the damage occurred (question 2 (a)) within the meaning of Article 7 (2) Brussel I bis in cases such as that at issue in these proceedings. It further asked the CJEU if it matters in this context that the claims are brought under the WAMCA regime by a legal person whose purpose, by virtue of its own right, is to represent the collective interests of multiple users having their registered offices in different jurisdictions  within one Member State (Question 1 (b) and 2 (b)). Lastly, the District Court asked whether, if multiple courts in the Member State have jurisdiction, Article 7 (2) Brussel I bis precludes the application of a national law that allows for the referral to a single court within the Member State (Question 1 (c) and 2 (c)).[29]

4. CJEU judgment

The CJEU commenced its judgment by finding that the courts of the Netherlands have international jurisdiction to hear the disputes in the main proceedings, but that the difficulty lies in determining which one of those courts with international jurisdiction has territorial jurisdiction. The CJEU concluded that any court that has substantive jurisdiction in these types of proceedings automatically has territorial jurisdiction as well on the basis of the Erfolgsort. The CJEU therefore did not deem it necessary to answer whether the jurisdiction could also be based on the basis of the Handlungsort (question 1 and question 2 (c)).[30]

The following key take aways arise from the CJEU’s judgment: 

Volvo e.a. is not the appropriate framework for establishing Erfolgsort in the context of these proceedings

After repeating the relevant criteria from Volvo e.a. for establishing the Erfolgsort, the CJEU held that those criteria cannot apply mutatis mutandis in the event of the purchase of digital products on an online platform, by an indefinite number of natural and/or legal persons who were unidentified at the time when the action was brought. The CJEU therefore found that the connecting factors need to be adapted. It did so by seeing the App Store NL as a virtual space that relates to the entire territory of the Netherlands.[31]

In this regard the Court held that the App Store NL is designed specifically for the Dutch market, that the language is Dutch, that apps are offered to users with an Apple ID associated with the Netherlands and that some of the apps are created specifically for the Dutch market. It could accordingly be considered that, for the reasons of determining where the damage occurred under Article 7 (2) Brussel I bis (i.e. the Erfolgsort), the virtual space constituted by the App Store NL and the context in which the purchases are made correspond to the entire territory of that State. When purchases are made in that virtual space, the damage occurs in that territory – irrespective of the place where the users concerned were located at the time of the relevant purchase.[32] The Court accordingly rejected Apple’s argument that the impossibility of determining the place where the damage occurred for each victim meant that the default rule in Article 4 (1) Brussel I bis (defendant place of domicile) should be applied.[33]

In its finding that the online platform is connected to the entire territory of the Member State, the CJEU departed from the non-binding Opinion of Advocate-General Campos Sánchez-Bordona, who had advised to locate the harmful event and the damage at the domicile of the user.[34]

The exact place where the damage occurred is not relevant in these proceedings

In its judgment the CJEU had specific regard to the nature the WAMCA as representative action proceedings and, in particular, the nature of foundations that act as representatives under that legal regime.

The CJEU pointed out that the applicant foundations had not brought proceedings based on multiple claims that were assigned to them by identified victims of anticompetitive conduct. The CJEU considered that, under Dutch law, collective action foundations act as independent promotors of the interest of persons who have similar interests. These persons are not referred to individually. The foundation thus exercises its own right to represent and defend the interests of the ‘strictly defined group’. It thereby brings together, in the words of the CJEU, “unidentified but identifiable persons”, namely users (whether consumer or professionals) who have purchased apps created by developers on the App Store NL to which those persons had access by means of their Apple ID associated with the Netherlands and whose domicile or registered office is likely, for the majority of those users, to be located throughout the territory of the Netherlands.[35]

With this, the court seems to refer to the fact that the persons in the strictly defined group are not identified at the moment of commencing the proceedings, but can be identified based on the criteria that they will have to meet in order to be considered part of the represented victims (which in turn entitles them to claim compensation).

The CJEU further pointed out that the strictly defined group has to be determined in a sufficiently precise manner and that the outcome of the proceedings is binding on the persons who meet the criteria of that group, provided that they have not expressed their wish to opt out of the proceedings.[36]

In those circumstances, a court that assesses its territorial jurisdiction cannot be expected to identify the precise place where the damage occurred for each individual victim or, even, for one or some of those victims.[37]

Any court having substantive jurisdiction has international and territorial jurisdiction to hear that action in its entirety on the basis of the Erfolgsort

The CJEU concluded that, in situations such as those at issue, any court having substantive jurisdiction to hear a representative action brought by an entity qualified to represent the collective interests of multiple unidentified but identifiable users will have international and territorial jurisdiction. In full, the conclusion of the CJEU reads:[38]

“In the light of all the foregoing considerations, the answer to parts (a) and (b) of the second question is that Article 7(2) of Regulation No 1215/2012 [Brussel I bis] must be interpreted as meaning that, within the market of a Member State allegedly affected by the implementation of anticompetitive conduct consisting of the charging by the operator of an online platform, aimed at all users established in that State, of excessive commission on the price of the apps and digital in-app products offered for sale on that platform, any court having substantive jurisdiction in that State to hear a representative action brought by an entity qualified to defend the collective interests of multiple unidentified but identifiable users who have purchased digital products on that platform has international and territorial jurisdiction, on the basis of the place where the damage occurred, to hear that action with regard to all those users.”

With its ruling, the Court’s judgment facilitates access to justice. It would, after all, be very impractical and inefficient if collective action foundations were required to bring proceedings in every court district in order to represent all victims. The CJEU has paid specific attention to the objectives and importance of collective action foundations such as ASC and RCJ. The Court has furthermore not turned a blind eye to the realities of online platforms. The judgment therefore offers a practical approach for establishing jurisdiction in case of anticompetitive conduct in digital markets.

The new interpretation of Article 7 (2) Brussel I bis is at least applicable when the market of a Member State is allegedly affected by the implementation of anticompetitive conduct consisting of the charging an excessive commission on the price of the apps and digital in-app products on an online platform, the online platform is aimed at all users in that State, and a representative action is brought on behalf of the collective interests of multiple unidentified but identifiable users who have purchased digital products on that platform. Time will tell how courts will apply this rule in other situations of anticompetitive conduct in digital markets. The reality of digital markets is that they are difficult to tie to one specific place. Strong arguments thus exist for deviating from the standard Volvo e.a. interpretation of Article 7 (2) Brussel I bis, in favour of the claimant, in other cases concerning anticompetitive conduct in digital markets as well.

The judgment is consistent with the objectives pursued by the Brussel I bis Regulation

In reaching its conclusion, the CJEU paid special attention to the objectives of Brussel I bis and the importance of public and private enforcement of competition law.

With regard to the objective of proximity between the court seized and the subject matter of the dispute, the CJEU noted that, due to the specific features of representative actions, the national court has to examine the existence of the alleged damage in relation to the strictly defined group who has suffered the same type of damage resulting from anticompetitive conduct implemented throughout the territory.[39] With regard to the predictability objective, the CJEU held that, since the App Store NL targets the Dutch market, it is predictable that a representative action concerning purchases made on that platform would be brought in any court in the Netherlands.[40]

The approach taken by the CJEU furthermore allows efficient procedural management of the proceedings, the taking and evaluation of the evidence by a single court, and the prevention of the risk of divergent decisions. The approach therefore also enshrines the objectives of sound administration of justice.[41]

Lastly, the CJEU affirmed that actions for damages for an infringement of competition law requires a complex factual and economic analysis. The grouping of individual claims facilitates the exercise of the right to compensation and the task of the court. The CJEU therefore held that the technical complexity of the relevant rules may militate in favour of a centralisation of jurisdiction, in particular in proceedings that relate to practices of operators running online platforms.[42]

5. Conclusion

With its judgment of 2 December 2025, the CJEU has recognized the nature of online platforms and the importance of efficient procedural management of representative actions.

The judgment affirms that the law on offline anticompetitive conduct cannot always be applied mutatis mutandis to anticompetitive conduct that takes place on online platforms. The CJEU judgment illustrates that, even on the topic of jurisdiction, the law cannot be interpreted in a static manner, but must pay attention to the unique features of digital markets. The judgment furthermore affirms the important role of representative actions within the EU and the need to interpret the law in a manner that enables it to achieve its objectives.